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Abstract—This paper describes the design and development of
a decentralized firewall system powered by a novel malware de-
tection engine. The firewall is built using blockchain technology.
The detection engine aims to classify Portable Executable (PE)
files as malicious or benign. File classification is carried out using
a deep belief neural network (DBN) as the detection engine. Our
approach is to model the files as grayscale images and use the
DBN to classify those images into the aforementioned two classes.
An extensive data set of 10,000 files is used to train the DBN.
Validation is carried out using 4,000 files previously unexposed
to the network. The final result of whether to allow or block a
file is obtained by arriving at a proof of work based consensus
in the blockchain network.
Index Terms—Malware, Blockchain consensus, Portable Exe-
cutable, Deep belief network, Restricted Boltzmann machine
I. INTRODUCTION
This study was motivated by the fact that the current mal-
ware detection systems are more predictable (in their behavior)
than predictive. Moreover, there is great potential in leveraging
the increased security offered by blockchain technology in se-
curing local networks. The conventional strategy for malware
detection is to maintain a database of malicious signatures. A
similar signature is generated for any incoming file and is run
through the database. The system heavily relies on updates
to this database for currency. There is hence a dire need for
malware detection that can perform well on previously unseen
attacks. This has the potential to outperform human prediction
in terms of time and versatility. Therefore, it is imperative that
a non-conventional and scalable approach be followed while
modeling malware.
Modeling the malware as a grayscale image (as per our
model) scales the complexity of the problem as per the
accuracy required and computational power available. The
blockchain based architecture ensures that no single node can
compromise the network. In order to overpower the network,
a user needs to have control of more than 50% nodes in
the network. The proof of work associated with a blockchain
requires that the computational power needed is exponential in
the length of the current longest chain. Furthermore, the final
consensus also takes into account the trust value of each node
in the network. This enables us to suppress the contribution
of defective nodes.
Several methods have been proposed for intelligent mal-
ware detection systems, e.g., a faster update and maintenance
system for decentralized anti-virus software using distributed
blockchain network and feedforward scanning [1], a deep
learning based method for automatic malware signature gen-
eration and classification [2], a deep learning approach us-
ing self-taught learning (STL) for Network Intrusion Detec-
tion System [3]. This paper uses a unique amalgamation of
blockchain technology and deep learning in order to design a
full-proof heuristic solution.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2
of this paper describes the system design and program flow,
while section 3 describes the novel detection engine that uses
DBN. Section 4 contains the results obtained for the malware
detection. Finally, section 5 concludes this paper and hence
the study.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN AND FLOW
The task of malware detection is carried out by the detection
engine that will be treated as a black box for the scope of
this section. The crux of the solution lies in utilising all the
machines in a local network for every incoming file to be
tested.
Whenever a node is added to the network, a central server
ships an unique trained model to it that will serve as the
detection engine at that node. Any incoming file to a node
in the network is first broadcasted to all the nodes (machines)
in the local network on which this system is deployed. This
broadcast will not be carried out in the blockchain. At every
node, this file is run through the detection engine (trained
model) present at that node. A point to be noted here, is that
all the nodes possess unique detection engines. The numeric
result produced by an engine represents the probability of the
file being malicious. This is hashed by the nodes own key and
added to the blockchain as a transaction.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
01
35
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 N
ov
 20
17
Fig. 1. Uniquely trained model shipped (by a central server) to each node in
the P2P network.
Fig. 2. File downloaded from the internet is broadcasted in the P2P network.
The node that broadcasted the file can then traverse the
chain to get the final verdict by performing a weighted average
of the probability values added to the chain by other nodes in
the network, corresponding to the same file. The weight given
to each nodes probability value is a direct measure of the trust
of that node in the network. This trust is updated after every
transaction based on the deviation of the nodes result from the
average probability over all the nodes in the network. Fig. 1,
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrate this flow.
Any unauthorized modifications to the blockchain in a node
will be automatically invalidated as the hash of that block
and the subsequent ones will be different. Hence the results
given out by the nodes cannot be tampered with. We have
used the ethereum network to implement our blockchain.
Ethereum is an open source, public, blockchain-based platform
which provides smart contract functionality. These smart con-
tracts are executed by the ethereum virtual machine(EVM).
Smart contracts are self-executing, self-enforcing protocols
that facilitate the enforcement of predefined contracts (event
responses) in a blockchain. We have used solidity language
for implementing ethereum smart contracts.
Fig. 3. Each machine processes the same file and determines the probability
of the file being malicious. The network finally comes to a consensus.
We implemented the firewall on a testnet using TestRPC (a
nodeJS based client that simulates the Ethereum blockchain
network). TestRPC creates a local P2P network consisting
of 10 accounts. Each node in the network controls one of
these accounts. Using smart contracts these accounts come to
a consensus on the nature of a file. All the events taking place
in the network like downloading of an external file, running
the neural net, trust updating etc are hashed and stored in the
blockchain as transactions (also called ledgers).
III. DETECTION ENGINE
The malware detection problem has effectively been reduced
to an image classification problem by modeling the PE files as
grayscale images. Every file is read byte by byte and each byte
value is stored as the grayscale intensity for the corresponding
pixel. Since files can easily exceed few megabytes in size, the
corresponding image will be of the order of megapixels. There
is hence a need to downscale the images to a fixed number
of pixels corresponding to the number of input neurons. This
process is carried out using python scripts that use the pillow
library for image processing. These images provide the system
with the insights from the headers and the machine code of
the file, in a different form.
It is important to note that this differs slightly from the
image classification problem with respect to translational and
rotational invariance. Since the spatial distribution of features
in the grayscale image represents the order of the correspond-
ing program elements of the PE file, it implies that a change
in the spatial distribution indicates a change in the sequence of
the program and can not be neglected. This is one reason why a
convolutional neural network (CNN) (or a related architecture)
has not been considered. It would fundamentally distort the
problem because CNNs exploit translational and rotational
invariance in the image for increasing the detection accuracy.
Since the data is noisy, it is better to use a generative model
for gathering hidden feature representations that could aid in
Fig. 4. DBN as a set of stacked RBMs.
the classification problem. Using DBN to detect malware has
been attempted previously, but with an entirely different way
of modeling the data [4], [5].
The dataset used in this study consists of 9342 malicious
files across 25 malware families and 4986 known benign files.
The malicious dataset was obtained from the MALIMG dataset
[6]. The benign files were obtained from vanilla windows
installations. The malicious dataset consisted of grayscale
images. The benign files were converted byte by byte into a
grayscale image and downscaled it to 64X64. We now describe
the detailed neural network architecture and training algorithm.
A. Overview of DBN
The Deep Belief Network (DBN) is a generative model that
consists of multiple stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machines
(RBM). RBM is a type of unsupervised neural network that
can represent non-linear patterns in data. An RBM is a two-
layer model that consists of a single visible layer and a single
hidden layer. Neurons of an RBM are stochastic binary units,
hence they can be in only one of the two states, either on or
off, with a given probability. Two layers of RBM are fully
connected via symmetric and undirected weights, and neurons
within a layer are not connected (shown in Fig 4). In an
RBM, each set of weight and biases defines energies of joint
configurations of visible and hidden units E (v, h), which is
defined in (1).
(v, h) =
∑
i∈vis
vibi +
∑
k∈hid
hkbk +
∑
i,j
vihkwik (1)
In (1) v, h represents the configuration of hidden and visible
unit respectively. vi, ji are binary state of the visible unit i
and hidden unit j.
p (v, h) =
e−E(v,h)∑
u,g e
−E(u,g) (2)
p (v, h) ∝ e−E(v,h) (3)
As shown in (2), The probability of the network stabilising
to a particular joint configuration of visible and hidden units
depends on the energy of that configuration compared with
the energy of all other joint configurations. If there are more
than few nodes, its not computationally possible to compute
the normalization term (partition function) in (2) because it
has exponentially many terms. Since as shown in (3) p (v, h)
is directly proportional to e−E(v,h) , we use Markov Chain
Monte Carlo to get samples from model starting from a global
configuration [7].
p (v) =
∑
h
p (h) p (v | h) (4)
We can express the RBM model as shown in (4). If we want
to improve p (v), it will suffice to improve p (h). To improve
p (h), we need it to be a better model than p (h,W ). We hence
add another layer to model p (h) as its input layer in order to
improve the hidden feature representation. This recursive logic
can be applied as many times in order to get the network
deeper by adding more layers. This intuitively describes why
stacking RBMs will make a better learning architecture. This
is called a DBN. Experimentally, for this data, 2 such layers
have sufficed to give the best accuracy as shown.
B. Training procedure
To train a DBN for obtaining hidden representations from
some data, one must consider it as a set of multiple stacked
RBMs. The RBMs are then trained separately. Layer by layer
greedy pretraining is done bottom up from the RBM that has
the input layer up to the last one preceding the softmax output
layer. This requires us to consider the input of one RBM as
the output of the one right below it (Fig. 4).
To train RBM following procedure is used. (5) shows
derivative of log of probability of visible vector v with respect
to weights. The angular brackets indicates expected value
of the given quantity. vihjdata represents expected value of
training data when visible vector v is fixed and equilibrium is
attained as per the energy function described in the previous
section. vihjmodel represents the expected value of model
when it attains equilibrium and all units are allowed to change.
∂log P (v)
∂wij
= vihjdata − vihjmodel (5)
Now we can show that the update rule for the weights will
be as shown in Eq. (6), where ε is the learning rate.
∆wij = ε (vihjdata − vihjmodel ) (6)
To calculate the weight update shown in (6) we use the
contrastive divergence algorithm by alternatively sampling
hidden units and visible units from one another [8]. In the
sampling process, binary states of visible units are calculated
using (7) and binary states of hidden units are calculated using
(8), where sigm represents the sigmoid function. In theory, the
sampling should be done an infinite number of times.
However, it is extremely inefficient to do so and hence
in practice we use contrastive divergence (CD) algorithm
(explained below) in which sampling is done for only a few
iterations. If we start sampling the hidden units from the data
on the visible units and then the visible units from the state
of the hidden units, the network configuration slowly enters
the regions of equilibrium defined as per the energy function
of the current weights and biases. When we know weights
are inaccurate, its waste of time to let it go all the way to
attain equilibrium in those regions. The final objective is to
raise the probability of data being generated at the visible
units. We hence change the weights right after a few (finite)
iterations of the sampling process such that the regions of
equilibrium shall, with a higher probability, contain the data
(or a reasonable approximation thereof) on the visible units.
Hence, a good compromise between speed and correctness is
to start with small weights and use CD for one iteration, and
as weights grow, to increase the number of iterations. In our
design, the number of iterations (k) for CD is modeled as
shown in (9), where ep represents the number of epochs for
which network is being trained.
p (vi = 1 | h) = sigm ( − bi − Σjwijhj) (7)
p (hj = 1 | v) = sigm ( − cj − Σiwjivi) (8)
This complete pretraining procedure, however, is not suf-
ficient. It is necessary to carry out fine tuning with some
labeled data, in order to make the class boundaries in the
probability density function more distinct. The weight updates
in this phase are small in magnitude but result in a much better
accuracy. This phase entails backpropagating the error from
the distribution of the output softmax layer to the RBMs. It
also makes the network scale up better with respect to the
number of layers.
k =
ep
10
+ 1 (9)
ε =
1
1 + e(
ep
10−5l)
(10)
The fine-tuning process (as per our design) is carried out by
using stochastic gradient descent on the output softmax layer
with the learning rate modeled as a function of the epochs and
layer as shown in (10).
C. Choosing hyperparameters
While there are some notions on how to optimise the
hyperparameters of a DBN, it finally comes down to ample
experimentation to find the right set of parameters. These
include the number of neurons per layer and number of layers
at the outset. A study was carried out to investigate the
correlation between the number of neurons in a layer to the
accuracy obtained for a classification problem [9]. We hence
use a deep belief network with 3000 hidden units in two hidden
layers each. Since the images have a downscaled resolution
TABLE I
ACCURACY AND TPR
Architecture Accuracy TPR
DBN2 89.28% 0.9826
DBN3 88.14% 0.9789
of 64X64, the input layer has 4096 neurons. The output is a
softmax layer with two neurons since it is a two class problem.
The learning and contrastive divergence rate is not constant
and is described above. Training is done in mini-batches of
size 10.
IV. RESULTS
We have done our experimentation on two different ar-
chitectures of DBN, DBN2 and DBN3 . DBN2 contains
two stacked RBMs and DBN3 contains three stacked RBMs.
Each layer of DBN2 and DBN3 contains 3000 hidden unit.
Results of our experiment, for hyperparameters defined in
the previous section, is shown in TABLE I. Since DBN2
performed better than DBN3 , we decided not to experiment
on DBN4 , i.e. a DBN with 4 layers.
V. CONCLUSION
This study is a proof of concept for the automation of
heuristic malware detection by which unknown malicious
attacks may also be prevented. It also highlights the impor-
tance and feasibility of amalgamation of various technologies
for cybersecurity. The integration of blockchain technology
with the novel detection engine provides full security over a
variably sized network. Future research may be carried out to
scale this up in terms of the dimensionality of the data given
to the DBN. This might offer more insight into the behavior
of the file but will require more computational resources.
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